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# TO THE HONORABLE COURT AND DEFENDANTS, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO AND CHRISTOPHER ALFRED THROUGH THEIR **ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

Pursuant to Local Rule 56-2 and the Court's Civil Standing Order, Plaintiff respectfully submits this Responsive Statement of Genuine Disputes of Material Facts and Additional Material Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

9 10	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
11	1. At approximately 11:12 pm, the San	Undisputed.
12	Bernardino County Sheriff's Dispatch Department ("Dispatch")	
13	received a call from Maria Gallo	
14	("Ms. Gallo") and Joseph Cocchi	
15	("Mr. Cocchi.") in Adelanto.	
16	Ex. B.	
17	Ex. D, p. 1 (23:12:53)	Objections: Hearsay (Federal Rules of
18	2. Ms. Gallo stated that their neighbor is "going crazy" and wouldn't let	Evidence ("FRE") 801, 802); Relevance
19	them enter their residence. She said	(FRE 401, 402); FRE 403.
20	the neighbor was asking her to take him somewhere. She was trying to	Otherwise, undisputed.
21	park in her driveway and he keeps	
22	trying to open her doors.	
23	Ex. A at p. 32:4-7, 14-17	
24	Ex. B at 00:23-00:39; 02:47-02:51	Objection: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802).
25	3. Ms. Gallo stated that the neighbor lived on the same property but	Objection: Hearsay (TRL 601, 602).
26	behind them at 12013.	Otherwise, undisputed.
27	Ex. B at 00:53-01:08	
28		

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3 4 5	4. Ms. Gallo provided a description of Plaintiff as a black male, last seen wearing a white t-shirt and jeans.	Undisputed.
6	Ex. A at p. 34:14-21 Ex. B at 01:18-01:46	Oli - 4 H (FDF 901 902)
8	5. Ms. Gallo then stated that he was taking things out of the vehicle.	Objections: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802). Relevance (FRE 401, 402); vague and ambiguous.
10	Ex. B at 01:58-2:00	Otherwise, undisputed.
11 12	6. Ms. Gallo stated that she believe he was possibly under the influence of alcoholic beverages and/or drugs.	Objections: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802); Relevance (FRE 401, 402); FRE 403; calls for speculation.
13 14	Ex. B at 02:27-02:30	Disputed to the extent that Deputy Alfred did not have any information
<ul><li>15</li><li>16</li><li>17</li></ul>		that Mr. Barber was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) to the Declaration of Renee V. Masongsong at 31:23-25.
18 19	7. Ms. Gallo reported that Plaintiff had a black Chevy Trailblazer.	Undisputed.
20	Ex. B at 03:30-03:37	
21   22	8. Dispatch transmitted the report over the air that Plaintiff was not letting	Objections: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802); Relevance (FRE 401, 402); FRE 403.
23 24	Ms. Gallo and Mr. Cocchi enter their residence and that Plaintiff lives behind Ms. Gallo and Mr. Cocchi.	Otherwise, undisputed.
25 26	Ex. D at p. 1 (23:12:53-23:13:58) Ex. E (00:15-00:30)	
27	9. Deputy Alfred copied.	Undisputed.
28	Ex. D at p. 1 (23:14:25; 2316:01)	

DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
Ex. E (00:34)	
10.Dispatch transmitted over the air that Plaintiff lives behind the reporting parties and the neighbor was wearing white shirt and jeans.  Ex. D at p. 1 (23:14:46)	Objections: Vague and ambiguous as to who was wearing the white shirt and jeans.  Otherwise, undisputed.
Ex. E (00:58-1:08)  11. Dispatch also transmitted over the air that Plaintiff was possibly intoxicated.	Objections: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802); Relevance (FRE 401, 402); FRE 403; calls for speculation.
Ex. D at p. 1 (23:15:38)	Disputed to the extent that Deputy Alfred did not have any information that Mr. Barber was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 31:23-25.
12. Shortly after 11:19 pm, Deputy Christopher Alfred arrived on the scene. He was the first to arrive and he was the only deputy to arrive  Ex. C at 00:27 Ex. D at p. 2 (23:19:45)	Objections: Vague and ambiguous.  Otherwise, undisputed that Deputy Alfred was the only deputy on scene at the time of the shooting.
Ex. E at 02:39  13. Ms. Gallo and Mr. Cocchi who advised him that Plaintiff was threatening them and slamming his hands on the car, striking the hood of their vehicle.	Objections: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802); Relevance (FRE 401, 402); FRE 403. Undisputed.
Ex. A at p. 31:6-11 Ex. C at 01:13-01:25; 02:14-02:15  14. Mr. Cocchi told Deputy Alfred that it was our neighbor behind us.	Objection: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802). Undisputed.

	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	1 2
		Ex. C at 00:30-00:32	3
	Objection: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802);	15. Mr. Cocchi stated that Plaintiff	4
r	Relevance (FRE 401, 402); calls for speculation; FRE 403.	might have a gun but did not see one.	5
	Disputed to the extent that:	Ex. A at p. 31:9-15 Ex. C at 01:35-02:08	7
		Ex. C at 01.53-02.08	8
	The reporting party did not report that they saw Mr. Barber with a weapon or		9
on.	that Mr. Barber said he had a weapon. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 31:12-18		10
	, , ,		11
	Deputy Alfred never saw a gun or othe weapon either on Mr. Barber or in the		12
18	Trailblazer at any time. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 13:7-18.		13
	, , ,		15
	Based on Deputy Alfred's experience, reporting party might state that a person		16
often	has a gun in order to expedite law enforcement response, and then it often		17
	turns out that the person did not have a		18
7.	gun. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 34:1-7.		19
•	O1: /: II (EDE 001 000)		20
2);	Objections: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802); Relevance (FRE 401, 402).	16. Mr. Cocchi told Deputy Alfred that they were scared.	
	Undisputed.		
	Objection: Relevance (FRE 401, 402)	17. Deputy Alfred believed that Ms.	
rd	the extent that this is not the standard for using deadly force.	Gallo and Mr. Cocchi feared for their safety.	25
			26
		Ex. A at p. 31:8	27
			28
7	reporting party might state that a per has a gun in order to expedite law enforcement response, and then it of turns out that the person did not have gun.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 34:1-7  Objections: Hearsay (FRE 801, 802 Relevance (FRE 401, 402).  Undisputed.  Objection: Relevance (FRE 401, 40 the extent that this is not the standard to the s	Ex. C at 02:33  17. Deputy Alfred believed that Ms.	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
18. Deputy Alfred walked up the	Undisputed.
driveway to talk to Mr. Plaintiff.	
Ex. A at p. 35:6-8. Ec. C at 02:34-02:40	
19. The surface of the driveway was gravel and dirt.  Ex. A at p. 17:25-18:2; 58:1-3  Exhibits 2.3. 8 to the Ex. 1	Disputed to the extent that the Trailblazer was parked on a low-friction surface consisting of dirt and gravel. Morales Decl. at ¶ 10.
Exhibits 2-3, 8 to the Ex. 1	The Trailblazer could not have moved as soon as the accelerator was engaged because the rear tires experienced a loss of traction, and the front tires had to overcome static friction. The surface composition created a mechanical limitation that prevented rapid acceleration and restricted maximum achievable speeds, regardless of accelerator input.  Morales Decl. at ¶ 10.
20. The driveway was a shared driveway between Ms. Gallo and Mr. Plaintiff.	Undisputed.
Ex. A at p. 32:9-10	Diamete 1
21. The driveway was narrow, equivalent to about one length of a car lane.	Disputed.  Deputy Alfred had ample time and room to move out of the path of the
Ex. A at p. 19:20-23; Exhibits 2-3, 8 to the Ex. 1.	Trailblazer. Morales Decl. at ¶ 7.  The driveway width was approximately 15 feet and 7 inches at the north end
	and 13 feet, 8 inches at the south end.  DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 9(e); Morales Decl. at  -5-

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3		¶ 7.
4		After the shooting, the left-front tire of
5		the Trailblazer was located
6		approximately 8 feet west of the chain- link fence, and the left-rear tire was
7		positioned about 6 feet west of the same fence.
8		Morales Decl. at ¶ 9.
9	22. In order to leave out of the driveway	Undisputed.
10	you have to reverse because it's one way in and one way out.	
11		
12   13	Ex. A at p. 49:21-50-2; Exhibits 2-5 to Ex. A.	
14	23. In order to leave out of the driveway	Undisputed.
15	you have to reverse because it's one way in and one way out.	
16		
17	Ex. A at p. 14:11-19  24. On one side of the driveway, to the	Disputed to the extent that there was an
18	left (the east side) was a chain-link	opening, three to four feet from the
19	fence. On the other side of the driveway (the west side) was a	stucco on the west side. Ex. A at p. 53:11-14.
20	picket fence.	•
21	Ex. A at p. 48:5-13; 58:6-11;	
22	Exhibits 3, 4	
23	25. Alfred used a flashlight, light source illuminated between the ground and	Undisputed.
24	him.	
25	Ex. A at p: 15:1-11	
26		
27		
28		

1	DEFENDANTS'	
2	UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3		
4	26. The colors of the uniform of the San	Undisputed.
5	Bernardino County Sheriff's	
6	Department are a tan top and green pants.	
7	-	
8	Ex. A at p. 56:16-57:12; Exhibit 1 to Ex. A	
9	Ex. G at p. 39:24-40:	
10	27. Deputy Alfred dropped the face covering towards his neck.	Undisputed that this is Alfred's testimony.
11		
12	Ex. A at pp. 56:25-57:12; Exhibit 1 to the Ex. A.	
13	28. Plaintiff's vehicle was parked in the	Undisputed.
14	driveway and the front was faced south.	
15	South.	
16	Ex. A at p. 17:17-21; Exhibit 2 to Ex. 1	
17	29. The cargo hatch was open.	Undisputed.
18		
19	Ex. A at p. 58:15-59:2, Exhibit 2 to Ex. A	
20	Ex. G at p. 46:14-19	D: 1
21	30. Deputy Alfred stood approximately 10 feet from the back of Plaintiff's	Disputed.
22   23	vehicle. on the north side of	At the time of the first shot, Deputy
24	Plaintiff's vehicle when he started giving commands to Plaintiff.	Alfred was approximately 51 feet to the rear of the Trailblazer.
25		Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
26	Ex. A at p. 72:1-7; 35:15-24	At the time of the last shot, Deputy
27		Alfred was approximately 21 feet to the
28		rear of the Trailblazer.  Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3		
4 5	31. Deputy Alfred stayed behind the Trail Blazer because in the event of	Disputed that a reasonable police officer would have employed these
6	fire fight or an exchange in gunfire,	tactics.
7	Plaintiff's vehicle could serve as a barrier.	After seeing the reverse lights come on,
8	Ex. A at p. 72:1-9.	Deputy Alfred failed to step out of the way.
9	2m.11 w p. 72.1 y.	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 41:1-3, 49:8-50:2.
10		
12		Deputy Alfred did not attempt to move out of the way to the left or to the right
13		before he fired the shots.
14		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 48:2-5.
15		A reasonable officer in Deputy Alfred's position would have immediately
16		moved to a position of cover and formulated an effective and safe tactical
17		plan.
18		DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 10(c).
19		At the time of this incident, Deputy Alfred had been trained not to tactically
20		position himself in a bad spot, if he can
21		avoid it, with respect to moving vehicles.
22		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 11:17-22.
23		The reporting party did not report that
24		they saw Mr. Barber with a weapon or
25		that Mr. Barber said he had a weapon. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 31:12-18.
26		Lamon 1 (1 med Depo) at 31.12-16.
27		

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3		Deputy Alfred never saw a gun or other
4		weapon either on Mr. Barber or in the Trailblazer at any time.
5		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 13:7-18.
6		Based on Deputy Alfred's experience, a
7		reporting party might state that a person
8		has a gun in order to expedite law enforcement response, and then it often
9		turns out that the person did not have a
10		gun. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 34:1-7.
11		Exmort 1 (Amed Depo) at 34.1 7.
12	32. To the left (east) was the chain-link	Objection: Vague and ambiguous.
13	fence approximately three to four feet away.	Otherwise, undisputed that there was
14	icci away.	approximately four feet of room on the
15	Ex. A at p. 17:22-24; 21:8-11	left side of the Trailblazer.
16	33. To the right (west) was the wall of the residence, approximately three to	Objection: vague and ambiguous. Otherwise, undisputed that there was
17	four feet away.	approximately four feet of room on the
18	Ex. A at p. 20:17-25; 21:1-4	right side of the Trailblazer.
19	34. Deputy Alfred gave Plaintiff verbal	Disputed to the extent that when Deputy
20	commands. Multiple times, he told Plaintiff to come towards him and to	Alfred was attempting to contact Mr. Barber in his driveway prior to the
21	display his hands.	shooting, Mr. Barber could not see
22	Ex. A at p. 37:10-38:12; 39:4-10.	Deputy Alfred. "Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) to the
23	Ex. C at 02:39-03:02	Declaration of Renee V. Masongsong at
24	Ex. G at p. 43:2-5; 14-17	42:6-43:9, 48:13-19.
25		Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did
26		not identify himself as a police officer. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.
27		, , ,
28		Mr. Barber heard a voice but did not see

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3		anyone in the driveway.
4		"Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 44:19-45:5.
5		
6		When Mr. Barber heard Deputy Alfred's voice, he thought it was his
7		neighbor speaking. "Exhibit 2" (Barber
8		Depo) at 35:10-20.
9	35. Plaintiff did not comply and instead	Disputed to the extent that when Deputy
10	told Deputy Alfred to show his	Alfred was attempting to contact Mr.
11	hands to Plaintiff and then told Deputy Alfred to "back up."	Barber in his driveway prior to the shooting, Mr. Barber could not see
12		Deputy Alfred. "Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 42:6-43:9,
13	Ex. A at p. 39:8-10. Ex. C at 03:02-03:03	48:13-19.
14	Ex. G at p. 43:3-5	Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did
15		not identify himself as a police officer.
16		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.
17		Mr. Barber heard a voice but did not see
18		anyone in the driveway. "Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 44:19-
19 20		45:5.
21		
22		When Mr. Barber heard Deputy Alfred's voice, he thought it was his
23		neighbor speaking. "Exhibit 2" (Barber
24	26 Plaintiff also hourd Donuty Alfred	Depo) at 35:10-20. Disputed to the extent that when Deputy
25	36. Plaintiff also heard Deputy Alfred say "Don't reach into your vehicle"	Alfred was attempting to contact Mr.
26	and then Plaintiff intentionally reached into his vehicle.	Barber in his driveway prior to the shooting, Mr. Barber could not see
27	reached into his vehicle.	Deputy Alfred.
28	Ex. G at p. 44	"Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 42:6-43:9, 48:13-19.

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS &	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	EVIDENCE	
		Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did
5		not identify himself as a police officer. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.
6		Mr. Darken beaud a vision but did not one
7		Mr. Barber heard a voice but did not see anyone in the driveway.
8		"Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 44:19-45:5.
9		
10 11		When Mr. Barber heard Deputy Alfred's voice, he thought it was his neighbor speaking. "Exhibit 2" (Barber
12		Depo) at 35:10-20.
13	37. At approximately 11:22, Deputy	Disputed to the extent that when Deputy
14	Alfred called out over the radio that	Alfred was attempting to contact Mr. Barber in his driveway prior to the
15	Plaintiff was not complying with his commands.	shooting, Mr. Barber could not see Deputy Alfred.
16	Ex. C at 03:04-03:08	"Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 42:6-43:9,
17	Ex. D at p. 2 (23:22:31)	48:13-19.
18		Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did
19		not identify himself as a police officer.
20		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.
$\begin{bmatrix} 21 \\ \end{bmatrix}$		Mr. Barber heard a voice but did not see
$\begin{bmatrix} 21 \\ 22 \end{bmatrix}$		anyone in the driveway. "Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 44:19-
$\begin{bmatrix} 22 \\ 23 \end{bmatrix}$		45:5.
24		When Mr. Barber heard Deputy Alfred's voice, he thought it was his
25		neighbor speaking. "Exhibit 2" (Barber
26		Depo) at 35:10-20.
27	38. Deputy Alfred ordered Plaintiff not to enter his vehicle and told him to	Disputed to the extent that when Deputy Alfred was attempting to contact Mr.
28	come towards him.	Barber in his driveway prior to the

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	Ex. C at 03:09-03:11	shooting, Mr. Barber could not see Deputy Alfred.
4	Ex. G at p. 43:14-15; 50:18-51:2	"Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 42:6-43:9,
5		48:13-19.
7		Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did not identify himself as a police officer.
8		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.
9		Mr. Barber heard a voice but did not see
10		anyone in the driveway. "Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 44:19-
11		45:5.
12		When Mr. Barber heard Deputy
13		Alfred's voice, he thought it was his neighbor speaking. "Exhibit 2" (Barber
14 15		Depo) at 35:10-20.
16	39. The vehicle was on and idling when Plaintiff got into the car.	Undisputed.
17		
18	Ex. A at 67:8-10; 71:21-23; 74:1-10 Ex. G at p. 46:21-47:3	
19	40. Deputy Alfred was still about 10	Disputed.
20	feet from the back of the vehicle.	At the time of the first shot, Deputy
21	Ex. A at p. 40:23-25.	Alfred was approximately 51 feet to the rear of the Trailblazer.
22		Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
23		At the time of the last shot, Deputy
24		Alfred was approximately 21 feet to the rear of the Trailblazer.
25   26		Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
27	41. Deputy Alfred believed that	Disputed that a reasonable police
28	Plaintiff's purpose of getting into the	officer would have employed these tactics.
	_	12-

1	DEFENDANTS'	
2	UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	car was to leave.	
4	Ev. A at p. 40-10, 14, 40-14, 16	After seeing the reverse lights come on,
5	Ex. A at p. 40:10-14; 49:14-16.	Deputy Alfred failed to step out of the way.
6		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 41:1-3, 49:8-50:2.
7		1,5,10, 6,0,1
8		Deputy Alfred did not attempt to move
9		out of the way to the left or to the right before he fired the shots.
10		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 48:2-5.
11		At the time of this incident, Deputy
12		Alfred had been trained not to tactically position himself in a bad spot, if he can
13		avoid it, with respect to moving
14		vehicles. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Days) at 11.17.22
15		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 11:17-22.
16		A reasonable officer in Deputy Alfred's
17		position would have moved to a position of cover and formulated an
18		effective and safe tactical plan.
19		DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 10(c).
20		
21	42. Deputy Alfred observed the reverse	Disputed that a reasonable police
22	lights of Plaintiff's vehicle come on.	officer would have employed these tactics.
23	Ex. A at p. 40:20-22	A françacina the neverse liebte come
24	Ex. G at p. 47:4-8	After seeing the reverse lights come on, Deputy Alfred failed to step out of the
25		way.
26		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 41:1-3, 49:8-50:2.
27		D 4 410 1 111 4 44
28		Deputy Alfred did not attempt to move out of the way to the left or to the right

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
	before he fired the shots. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 48:2-5.
	A reasonable officer in Deputy Alfred's position would have immediately moved to a position of cover and formulated an effective and safe tactical plan.  DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 10(c).
	At the time of this incident, Deputy Alfred had been trained not to tactically position himself in a bad spot, if he can avoid it, with respect to moving vehicles. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 11:17-22.
	Deputy Alfred had ample time and room to move out of the path of the Trailblazer.  Morales Decl. at ¶ 7; DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 9.
43. Deputy Alfred had no immediate indication that the vehicle would reverse until Plaintiff entered it and the reverse lights came on.  Ex. A at p. 49:4-7	Disputed.  Defendants' Fact No. 41.  Ms. Gallo stated that Mr. Barber was asking her to take him somewhere, presumably because he wanted to leave. Ex. A at p. 32:4-7, 14-17 Ex. B at 00:23-00:39; 02:47-02:51  Disputed that a reasonable police officer would have employed these tactics.  After seeing the reverse lights come on,
	43. Deputy Alfred had no immediate indication that the vehicle would reverse until Plaintiff entered it and the reverse lights came on.

1	DEFENDANTS'	DI AINTIEESC DECDONCE
2	UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	E ( ID E ( OE	Deputy Alfred failed to step out of the
4		way. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 41:1-3,
5		49:8-50:2.
6		Deputy Alfred did not attempt to move
7		out of the way to the left or to the right before he fired the shots.
8		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 48:2-5.
9		A reasonable officer in Deputy Alfred's position would have immediately
11		moved to a position of cover and
12		formulated an effective and safe tactical
13		plan. DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 10(c).
14		" · · ·
		At the time of this incident, Deputy Alfred had been trained not to tactically
15		position himself in a bad spot, if he can
16		avoid it, with respect to moving vehicles.
17		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 11:17-22.
18		
19		Deputy Alfred had ample time and room to stay out of the path of the
20		Trailblazer.
21		Morales Decl. at ¶ 7.
22	44. The engine of the vehicle revved and	Objection: vague and ambiguous as to "revved."
23	then the car started moving in reverse.	10.104.
24		Disputed to the extent that the
25	Ex. A at p. 49.	Trailblazer was parked on a low-friction surface consisting of dirt and gravel.
26	Ex. C: 03:13-03:14 Ex. G at p. 47:4-15; 48:17-22	The surface conditions reveals a mixed
	1 - 7 - 1	composition driving surface that
27		significantly impacted vehicle traction capabilities.
28		Morales Decl. at ¶ 10.

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS &	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	EVIDENCE	
4		The Trailblazer could not have moved
5		as soon as the accelerator was engaged because the rear tires experienced a loss
6		of traction, and the front tires had to
7		overcome static friction. The surface composition created a mechanical
8		limitation that prevented rapid
9		acceleration and restricted maximum achievable speeds, regardless of
10		accelerator input.
11		Morales Decl. at ¶ 10.
12		Disputed to the extent that The
13		Trailblazer was either not in motion when Deputy Alfred started firing his
14		shots or was moving at a slow speed of
15		under 1 mile per hour. At the time of the first shot, the Trailblazer had moved
16		backwards less than one foot. At the
17		time of the second shot, the vehicle still had not traveled backwards more than
18		one foot. At the time of the last shot, the
19		vehicle had started decelerating and was moving at approximately under 1 mile
20		per hour before coming to rest.
21		Morales Decl. at ¶ 11.
22	45. Deputy Alfred called out over the	Undisputed.
23	radio that Plaintiff was trying to reverse.	
24		
25	Ex. C at 03:13-03:15	Disputed.
26	46. The tires gained traction on the hard packed dirt.	Disputed.
27	-	The Trailblazer was parked on a low-
28	Ex. 2 to Ex. A. Ex. C at 03:14:82- 03:16:277	friction surface consisting of dirt and gravel. The surface conditions reveals a

1	DEFENDANTS'	
2	UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3		Morales Decl. at ¶ 7; DeFoe Decl. at ¶
4		9.
5		Disputed to the extent that the
6		Trailblazer was parked on a low-friction surface consisting of dirt and gravel.
7		The surface conditions reveals a mixed
8		composition driving surface that significantly impacted vehicle traction
9		capabilities.
10		Morales Decl. at ¶ 10.
11		The Trailblazer could not have moved
12		as soon as the accelerator was engaged because the rear tires experienced a loss
13		of traction, and the front tires had to
14		overcome static friction. The surface composition created a mechanical
15		limitation that prevented rapid
16		acceleration and restricted maximum achievable speeds, regardless of
17		accelerator input.
18		Morales Decl. at ¶ 10.
19		When Mr. Barber's vehicle rolled
20		backwards, it moved in a straight line.  The resting position of the vehicle after
21		the incident shows that the wheels are
22		straight, meaning that Mr. Barber never changed the direction of the vehicle.
23		Morales Decl. at ¶ 13.
24		Disputed to the extent that The
25		Disputed to the extent that The Trailblazer was either not in motion
26		when Deputy Alfred started firing his
27		shots or was moving at a slow speed of under 1 mile per hour. At the time of
28		the first shot, the Trailblazer had moved

1	DEFENDANTS'	
2	UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3		Alfred was approximately 51 feet to the rear of the Trailblazer.
4   5		Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
		At the time of the last shot, Deputy
6		Alfred was approximately 21 feet to the
7		rear of the Trailblazer.  Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
8		Tribitates Been at    Tot
9	49. In order to get to the opening on the	Objection: vague and ambiguous.
10	west side to him, Alfred would have had to move closer to the car.	Disputed.
11	nad to move closer to the car.	Disputed.
12	Ex. A at p. 60:7-16; 93:3-7; Exhibit 4 to Ex. A	Deputy Alfred had ample time and room to move out of the path of the
13	Exhibit 4 to Ex. A	Trailblazer.
14		Morales Decl. at ¶ 7; DeFoe Decl. at ¶
15		9.
16		At the time of the first shot, Deputy
17		Alfred was approximately 51 feet to the rear of the Trailblazer.
18		Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
19		At the time of the last shot, Deputy
20		Alfred was approximately 21 feet to the
21		rear of the Trailblazer.
22		Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
23	50. Deputy Alfred fired six shots at	Undisputed.
24	Plaintiff.	
25	Ex. A at p. 7:11-12; 13:5-6	
26	Ex. B at 03:47-49	
27	Ex. C at 03:16-03:19  51. After Deputy Alfred's last shot, the	Disputed.
28	truck moved back approximately one	1

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2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3 4	foot and stopped after making contact with an area by the wall to the west.	After the shooting, Mr. Barber's foot was on the brake pedal. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 53:24-
5	Ex. A at 44:24-45:6; 53:2-4	54:3.
7		The vehicle came to a stop because Mr. Barber stepped on the brakes. The
8		evidence indicates that Mr. Barber applied the brakes mildly, as opposed to
9		slamming on the brakes. The vehicle gradually decelerated after the brakes
11		were pressed while remaining in reverse gear.
12		Morales Decl. at ¶ 15.
13   14		When the deputies were removing Mr. Barber from the Trailblazer after the
15		shooting, the Trailblazer moved backwards an additional two to three
16		feet. Morales Decl. at ¶ 20.
17 18	52. Deputy Alfred called out over the radio that Plaintiff tried to reverse	Undisputed that this is Alfred's testimony.
19	into him and requested medical services.	J
20	Ex. B at 03:37	
21 22	Ex. C at 23:22:44	D: 4.14.41 4.41.41 4.11.41.41
23	53. Plaintiff was injured in the head.	Disputed to the extent that Plaintiff was shot in the head.
24	Ex. A at p. 52:12-13. Ex. G at p. 52:18-22	
25	54. Because the car was in reverse gear, once Plaintiff was extracted from the	Undisputed.
26 27	vehicle for medical services, the vehicle slowly went in reverse	
28	because it was in reverse gear and	

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	one of Deputy Alfred's partners	
$_{4}\Vert$	placed it park to stop the vehicle	
5	from reversing.	
6	Ex. A at p. 52:18-23; 53:24-54:3 Ex. C at 09:27-09:30	
7	55. Plaintiff was arrested and booked for	Disputed to the extent that Mr. Barber
8	PC 245(c), assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer.	was not convicted of this offence. "Ex. I."
9	weapon on a peace officer.	
10	Ex. F	
11	56. Plaintiff was charged with the attempted murder of Deputy Alfred	Disputed to the extent that Mr. Barber was charged with attempted murder of a
12	and Penal Code section 245(a) and	peace officer, but was unanimously
13	convicted of Penal Code 245(a).	found not guilty by jurors. "Ex. I."
14	Ex. H; Ex. K	
15	57. Plaintiff sentenced to 14 years.	Disputed to the extent that Mr. Barber's sentencing included a prior and
16	Ex. I	unrelated probation violation regarding an assault on a peace officer. Mr.
17		Barber was found not guilty on
18		attempted murder and assault on a
19		peace officer as it relates to Deputy Alfred.
20		"Ex. I."
21	58. Deputy Alfred received training at	Undisputed.
22	the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Academy for use of force, including	
23	use of deadly force, the policy	
24	related to the use of deadly force, and the policy related to shooting at	
25	moving vehicles.	
26	Ev. A. p. 10.2 12.4. 22.22 26.1.	
27	Ex. A, p. 10:2-13:4; 23:23-26:1; 89:14-92:12	
28	59. Deputy Alfred has used the firearm	Undisputed.

in the field before the date of the	
April 27, 2021 shooting.	
Ex. A, p. 25:25-29:17	
60. The San Bernardino County	Undisputed that this is the County
-	Policy.
of the force used shall be evaluated	Disputed to the extent that at the time of
from the perspective of a reasonable	this incident, Deputy Alfred understood
based on the totality of the	that the County of San Bernardino's policy directed that deputies "shall not"
circumstances known or perceived	shoot at a moving vehicle.
rather than with the benefit of	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 10:14-
hindsight. The totality of the	11:22.
be forced to make quick judgments	
circumstances that are tense,	
uncertain and rapidly evolving."	
Ex. L at COSB000672-	
	Undisputed that this is the County
	Policy.
provides that the evaluation of	·
1 0	Disputed to the extent that at the time of this incident, Deputy Alfred understood
consideration a number of factors	that the County of San Bernardino's
including, but not limited to	policy directed that deputies "shall not"
confronted (as reasonably perceived	shoot at a moving vehicle.
by [him] at the time"; "[t]he	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 10:14- 11:22.
	So. The San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department Manuel provides that "[t]he 'reasonableness' of the force used shall be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable safety member in the same situation, based on the totality of the circumstances known or perceived by the safety member at the time, rather than with the benefit of hindsight. The totality of the circumstances shall account for occasions when safety members may be forced to make quick judgments about using force, and the amount of force that is necessary, in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving."  Ex. L at COSB000672- COSB000673.  The San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department Manuel provides that the evaluation of whether a deputy has used reasonable force shall take into a consideration a number of factors including, but not limited to "behavior of the individual being confronted (as reasonably perceived

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	resources are reasonably available to	
4	the deputy under the circumstances); "[t]he training and experience of the	
5	deputy"; "[t]he potential for injury to	
6	citizens, [and himself]"; and "[t]he risk of escape."	
7	•	
8	Ex. L at COSB000673-4.	Undisputed that this is the County
9	62. The San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department Manuel	Policy.
10	provide that "[a]lternatives to force	
11	are not required by a member when the member reasonably believes that	Disputed to the extent that at the time of this incident, Deputy Alfred understood
12	immediate action must be taken to	that the County of San Bernardino's
13	prevent injury to themselves, another member of public."	policy directed that deputies "shall not" shoot at a moving vehicle.
14		
15	Ex. L at COSB000675.	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 10:14- 11:22.
16		Disputed to the extent that Deputy
17		Alfred had ample time and room to
18		move out of the path of the Trailblazer rather than shooting.
19		Morales Decl. at ¶ 7; DeFoe Decl. at ¶
20		9.
21		
22	62. The San Demanding Country	Undisputed that this is the County
23	63. The San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department Manuel	Policy.
24	provides "[a] safety member may use	
25	lethal force to protect himself or others from what he reasonably	Disputed to the extent that at the time of this incident, Deputy Alfred understood
26	believes to be an immediate threat of	that the County of San Bernardino's
27 28	death or serious bodily injury [or] to accomplish the arrest or prevent the escape of a suspected felon,	policy directed that deputies "shall not" shoot at a moving vehicle.

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	when the member has probable cause	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 10:14-
4	to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious	11:22.
5	bodily injury to the deputy of	Disputed to the extent that Deputy
6	others."	Alfred had ample time and room to
7	Ex. L at COSB000676.	move out of the path of the Trailblazer rather than shooting.
8		Morales Decl. at ¶ 7; DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 9.
9		9.
10 11		Disputed to the extent that the time of the shooting, Deputy Alfred had no
12		information that Mr. Barber had ever
		physically injured anyone. "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 30:18-20.
13		Exhibit 1 (Affied Depo) at 50.16-20.
14	64. The San Bernardino County	Undisputed that this is the County
15	Sheriff's Department Manuel	Policy.
16	provides that "[f]irearms should not be discharged from or at a moving	Disputed to the extent that at the time of
17	vehicle except in exigent	this incident, Deputy Alfred understood
18	circumstances. In these situations, a	that the County of San Bernardino's
19	safety member must have articulable reason(s) for this use of lethal force,	policy directed that deputies "shall not" shoot at a moving vehicle.
20	which include, but are not limited to	_
21	[t]he vehicle is operated in a manner which is likely to result in	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 10:14- 11:22.
22	great bodily injury or death to a	11.22.
23	safety member or another person, and other reasonable means of	Disputed to the extent that police
24	defense have been exhausted, or are	officers are trained that a threat of death or serious injury is imminent when,
25	not available or practical. This may	based upon the totality of the
26	include, if time and circumstances allow, moving out of the path of the	circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a
27	vehicle."	person has the present ability,
28	Ex. L at COSB000677-8.	opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious
_0	EA. L at COSDUUUI / /-0.	ininiculately cause death of sellous

1	DEFENDANTS'	
2	UNCONTROVERTED FACTS &	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	EVIDENCE	bodily injury to the peace officer or
4		another person.
5 6		DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 6(c) (citing PC 835a); "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 91:4-13.
7		Disputed to the extent that police
8		standards instruct that subjective fear
9		alone does not justify the use of deadly
10		force. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how
11		great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one
12		that from appearances, must be instantly
13		confronted and addressed.
14		DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 6(d).
15		
16	65. Alfred's understanding of training is	Disputed to the extent that at the time of this incident, Deputy Alfred understood
17 18	if feasible, step out of the way, rather than shooting at the vehicle.	that the County of San Bernardino's policy directed that deputies "shall not"
19	Ex. A at p. 48:20-25	shoot at a moving vehicle.
	1. 11 at p. 10.20 23	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 10:14-
20		11:22.
21		Otherwise, undisputed.
22	66. Deputy Alfred was approximately	Disputed.
23	10 to 15 feet behind Plaintiff's	
24	vehicle as he fired the shots.	At the time of the first shot, Deputy Alfred was approximately 51 feet to the
25	Ex. A at p. 14:5-7; 15:12-16:1.	rear of the Trailblazer.
26	,	Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
27		At the time of the last shot, Deputy
28		Alfred was approximately 21 feet to the

1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS & EVIDENCE	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3 4		rear of the Trailblazer. Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
5		Disputed to the extent that Deputy
6 7		Alfred had ample time and room to move out of the path of the Trailblazer
8		rather than shooting.  Morales Decl. at ¶ 7; DeFoe Decl. at ¶
9		9.
10	67. Deputy Alfred observed movements consistent with someone who's	Objections: Vague as to time.
11   12	armed with a firearm.	Disputed.
13	Ex. A at p. 13:10	The reporting party did not report that
14		they saw Mr. Barber with a weapon or that Mr. Barber said he had a weapon.
15		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 31:12-18.
16 17		Deputy Alfred never saw a gun or other weapon either on Mr. Barber or in the
18		Trailblazer at any time.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 13:7-18.
19		
20		Based on Deputy Alfred's experience, a reporting party might state that a person
21    22		has a gun in order to expedite law enforcement response, and then it often
23		turns out that the person did not have a gun.
24		"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 34:1-7.
25	68. Plaintiff did not attend therapy or	Disputed to the extent that there is no
26	counseling or take any medication for any mental or emotional types of	evidence that Mr. Barber had the opportunity to attend therapy or
27 28	injuries.	counseling or take any medication for any mental or emotional types of
		27-

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1 2	DEFENDANTS' UNCONTROVERTED FACTS &	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
3	EVIDENCE Ex. G at 65:1-6; 65:23-66:7	injuries, given that he was incarcerated
4		after the shooting.
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### PLAINTIFF'S ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS

1	I LAINTIFF S ADDITION	THE WHITEHUME THE IS
2 3	PLAINTIFF'S ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACT	SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
3	Backgr	ound
4	69.Deputy Alfred had never seen Mr.	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 29:20-
5	Barber prior to this incident and had	24, 30:11-17.
6	no specific information about him.	
	70.At the time of the shooting, Deputy	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 30:18-
7	Alfred had no information that Mr.	20.
8	Barber had ever physically injured	
9	anyone.	
10	71. The reporting party did not report	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 31:12-
	that they saw Mr. Barber with a	18.
11	weapon or that Mr. Barber said he	
12	had a weapon.	
13	72.Deputy Alfred never saw a gun or	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 13:7-18.
	other weapon either on Mr. Barber or	
14	in the Trailblazer at any time.	
15	73.Based on Deputy Alfred's	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 34:1-7.
16	experience, a reporting party might	
17	state that a person has a gun in order	
	to expedite law enforcement	
18	response, and then it often turns out	
19	that the person did not have a gun.	
20	74.Deputy Alfred did not have any	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 31:23-
	information that Mr. Barber was	25.
21	under the influence of drugs or	
22	alcohol.	
23	75.Deputy Alfred knew that Mr. Barber	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 32:11-
	was in his own driveway.	17.
24	76.The driveway width was	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 9(e); Morales Decl.
25	approximately 15 feet and 7 inches at	at ¶ 7.
26	the north end and 13 feet and 8	
27	inches at the south end.	

28

1	77.During this incident, Deputy Alfred	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 26:17-
2	was armed with a Taser, a police	23.
3	baton, and OC spray.	
	78. During this incident, Deputy Alfred	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 15:1-11.
4	had a flashlight that provided some	
5	illumination.	
6	79.Deputy Alfred was the starting point	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 22:11-
	guard of his varsity high school	19.
7	basketball team.	
8	The She	
9	80. When Deputy Alfred was attempting	"Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 42:6-
10	to contact Mr. Barber in his driveway	43:9, 48:13-19.
	prior to the shooting, Mr. Barber	
11	could not see Deputy Alfred.	
12	81.Mr. Barber heard a voice but did not	"Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 42:6-
13	see anyone in the driveway.	43:8, 44:19-45:5.
14	82. When Barber heard Deputy Alfred's	"Exhibit 2" (Barber Depo) at 35:10-
	voice, he thought it was his neighbor	20.
15	speaking.	((F 1 7 : 1 m (A10 1 B ) ) (26 10
16	83. Prior to firing his shots, Deputy	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 36:19-
17	Alfred formed the impression that	21, 40:10-22, 74:1-13.
18	Mr. Barber's vehicle was on and that	
	Mr. Barber wanted to leave.	Maralas Daal at ¶ 10
19	84. The Trailblazer was parked on a low-	Morales Decl. at ¶ 10.
20	friction surface consisting of dirt and gravel.	
21	85. The Trailblazer could not have	Morales Decl. at ¶ 10.
22	moved as soon as the accelerator was	Worldes Deel. at    10.
	engaged because the rear tires	
23	experienced a loss of traction, and	
24	the front tires had to overcome static	
25	friction. The surface composition	
	created a mechanical limitation that	
26	prevented rapid acceleration and	
27	restricted maximum achievable	
28		

1	speeds, regardless of accelerator	
$2 \parallel$	input.	
3	86.Deputy Alfred was not struck by any	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 68:
	gravel or dirt from the tires prior to	
4	the shooting.	
5	87. Deputy Alfred intentionally fired six	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 16:12-
6	shots at Mr. Barber with the intent of	19, 17:7-16.
7	striking him.	D. D. D. 1. (50)
·	88. At the time of the shooting, it was	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 9.
8	not the case that any person was	
9	about to be run over by the	
10	Trailblazer with no opportunity to get	
11	out of the way.  89.Deputy Alfred had ample time and	Morales Decl. at ¶ 7; DeFoe Decl. at ¶
12	room to move out of the path of the	9.
	Trailblazer rather than shooting.	
13	90. At the time of the shooting, Deputy	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 9(f); "Exhibit 1"
14	Alfred had approximately two to four	(Alfred Depo) at 18:8-22; "Exhibit 3"
15	feet between the left side of his body	(scene photo).
16	and the chain link fence to his left.	
	91. When the Trailblazer rolled	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 61:19-
17	backwards, it did so in a straight line.	22; Morales Decl. at ¶ 13.
18	The resting position of the vehicle	
19	after the incident shows that the	
20	wheels are straight, meaning that Mr.	
	Barber never changed the direction	
21	of the vehicle.	
22	92. Deputy Alfred failed to give Mr.	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 9(c); "Exhibit 1"
23	Barber a verbal warning that he was	(Alfred Depo) at 13:19-21.
24	prepared to use deadly force before	
25	shooting.	M 1 D 1 4 111
	93. When Deputy Alfred fired his first	Morales Decl. at ¶ 11.
26	shot, the Trailblazer was either not in motion or was moving at a slow	
27	speed of under one mile per hour.	
28	speed of under one finite per flour.	

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1	94.At the time of the first shot, the	Morales Decl. at ¶ 11.
2	Trailblazer had moved backwards	
3	less than one foot.	
	95.At the time of the second shot, the	Morales Decl. at ¶ 11.
4	Trailblazer still had not traveled	
5	backwards more than one foot.	
6	96.At the time of the last shot, the	Morales Decl. at ¶ 11.
7	vehicle had started decelerating and	
·	was moving at approximately under	
8	one mile per hour before coming to	
9	rest.	
10	97. At the time of the first shot, Deputy	Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
11	Alfred was approximately 51 feet to the rear of the Trailblazer.	
12	98. At the time of the last shot, Deputy	Morales Decl. at ¶ 16.
	Alfred was approximately 21 feet to	"
13	the rear of the Trailblazer.	
14	99.Deputy Alfred was in motion and	Morales Decl. at ¶ 19.
15	advancing toward the Trailblazer	"
16	during the shooting sequence, at a	
	pace faster than normal human	
17	walking pace.	
18		
19	100. The vehicle came to a stop	Morales Decl. at ¶ 15.
20	because Mr. Barber stepped on the	
21	brakes. The evidence indicates that	
	Mr. Barber applied the brakes mildly,	
22	as opposed to slamming on the	
23	brakes. The vehicle gradually	
24	decelerated after the brakes were	
25	pressed while remaining in reverse	
	gear.  101. The maximum speed the	Morales Decl. at ¶ 1/4
26	Trailblazer reached during the six	Morales Decl. at ¶ 14.
27	shots was approximately 3.4 miles	
28	per hour.	
	per nour.	

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1	102. Based on standard biomechanical	Morales Decl. at ¶ 14.
2	data, the average human walking	
3	speed ranges from 3.0 to 3.5 miles	
	per hour, meaning the vehicle's	
4	maximum speed was equivalent to or	
5	slightly faster than a person walking	
6	at normal pace.	
7	103. Deputy Alfred never had to dive	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 48:17-
	out of the way of the Trailblazer.	19.
8	104. Deputy Alfred was not struck by	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 48:14-
9	the Trailblazer.	16.
10	105. After the shooting, Mr. Barber's	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 53:24-
11	foot was on the brake pedal.	54:3.
	106. When the deputies were	Morales Decl. at ¶ 20.
12	removing Mr. Barber from the	
13	Trailblazer after the shooting, the Trailblazer moved backwards an	
14	additional two to three feet.	
15		Nagliganas
15	Pre-Shooting	Negligence
15 16	Pre-Shooting 107. Police officers are expected to	Negligence DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.
	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.
16 17	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity	
16 17 18	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.
16 17 18 19	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.
16 17 18	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.
16 17 18 19	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make contact with Mr. Barber.	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 33:4-6.
16 17 18 19 20 21	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make contact with Mr. Barber.  110. Prior to the shooting, Deputy	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 33:4-6.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make contact with Mr. Barber.  110. Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did not identify himself as a	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 33:4-6.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make contact with Mr. Barber.  110. Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did not identify himself as a police officer.	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 33:4-6.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make contact with Mr. Barber.  110. Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did not identify himself as a police officer.  111. After seeing the reverse lights	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 33:4-6.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 41:1-3,
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make contact with Mr. Barber.  110. Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did not identify himself as a police officer.  111. After seeing the reverse lights come on, Deputy Alfred failed to	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 33:4-6.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make contact with Mr. Barber.  110. Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did not identify himself as a police officer.  111. After seeing the reverse lights come on, Deputy Alfred failed to step out of the way.	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 33:4-6.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 41:1-3, 49:8-50:2.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make contact with Mr. Barber.  110. Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did not identify himself as a police officer.  111. After seeing the reverse lights come on, Deputy Alfred failed to step out of the way.  112. Deputy Alfred did not attempt to	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 33:4-6.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 41:1-3,
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Pre-Shooting  107. Police officers are expected to follow their own department policies.  108. Deputy Alfred used profanity with Mr. Barber during this incident.  109. Deputy Alfred did not request backup before attempting to make contact with Mr. Barber.  110. Prior to the shooting, Deputy Alfred did not identify himself as a police officer.  111. After seeing the reverse lights come on, Deputy Alfred failed to step out of the way.	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:7-19.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 33:4-6.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 38:20-22.  "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 41:1-3, 49:8-50:2.

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1	113. A reasonable officer in Deputy	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 10(c).
2	Alfred's position would have moved	
3	to a position of cover and formulated	
	an effective and safe tactical plan.	
4	Police Officer Train	
5	114. Basic police officer training	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.
6	teaches that shooting at a moving	
	vehicle has shown to be a poor tactic	
7	in most scenarios. If a driver is	
8	wounded or killed when operating a	
9	motor vehicle, it prevents their ability	
10	to effectively operate a motor	
	vehicle.	D.E. D. 1 . 6.7
11	115. An assaultive motor vehicle does	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 7.
12	not presumptively justify the use of	
13	deadly force.	((T-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-
14	116. At the time of this incident,	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 10:14-
	Deputy Alfred understood that the	11:22.
15	County of San Bernardino's policy directed that deputies "shall not"	
16	shoot at a moving vehicle.	
17	117. At the time of this incident,	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 10:14-
18	Deputy Alfred had been trained to	11:22.
	get out of the path of a moving	11.22.
19	vehicle, if feasible, rather than	
20	shooting at it.	
21	118. At the time of this incident,	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 11:17-
22	Deputy Alfred had been trained not	22.
	to tactically position himself in a bad	
23	spot, if he can avoid it, with respect	
24	to moving vehicles.	
25	119. Under the facts of this case and	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 8.
26	pursuant to police standards and	
	training, it would have been	
27	inappropriate for Deputy Alfred to	
28	shoot at Mr. Barber for fleeing or	
		34-

justify shooting a vehicle or its driver simply because that vehicle was fleeing or trying to leave the area.  120. Basic police training and standards instruct that deadly force should only be used on the basis of an "objectively reasonable" belief that the suspect poses an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury.  121. Police officers are trained that a threat of death or serious injury is imminent when, based upon the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or another person.  122. Police standards instruct that subjective fear alone does not justify the use of deadly force. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.  123. Police officers are trained that deadly force should only be used when no reasonable alternative	1	attempting to flee. Police officers are	
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simply because that vehicle was fleeing or trying to leave the area.  120. Basic police training and standards instruct that deadly force should only be used on the basis of an "objectively reasonable" belief that the suspect poses an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury.  121. Police officers are trained that a threat of death or serious injury is imminent when, based upon the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or another person.  122. Police standards instruct that subjective fear alone does not justify the use of deadly force. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.  123. Police officers are trained that deadly force should only be used when no reasonable alternative  stanbit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 41:24 42:2, 43:13-18; DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 6(c) (citing PC 835a); "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 91:4-13.  DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 6(c) (citing PC 835a); "Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 91:4-13.  DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 6(d).		justify shooting a vehicle or its driver	
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and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.  26	21	harm is not merely a fear of future	
likelihood of the harm, but is one that from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.  26   123. Police officers are trained that deadly force should only be used when no reasonable alternative	22		
likelihood of the harm, but is one that from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.  26   123. Police officers are trained that deadly force should only be used when no reasonable alternative	$_{23}$		
25 confronted and addressed.  26 123. Police officers are trained that deadly force should only be used when no reasonable alternative			
26 l 123. Police officers are trained that deadly force should only be used when no reasonable alternative			
deadly force should only be used when no reasonable alternative	25		
when no reasonable alternative	26		Defoe Decl. at $\P$ 6(1).
when no reasonable alternative	27		
measures are available.			
	20	measures are available.	

1	124. Police officers are trained to give	DeFoe Decl. at $\P$ 6(j).
2	a verbal warning prior to using	
3	deadly force.	
	125. Basic police training teaches that	DeFoe Decl. at $\P$ 6(h).
4	an overreaction in using deadly force	
5	is excessive force.	
6	126. Deputy Alfred violated basic	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 9.
7	police officer training and standards	
	with respect to the use of deadly	
8	force when he shot Mr. Barber while	
9	Mr. Barber occupied the driver seat	
10	of a vehicle. A reasonable officer	
11	acting consistent with standard police	
	practices would not have used lethal force in this situation. Mr. Barber	
12	did not pose an immediate threat of	
13	death or serious bodily injury to	
14	Deputy Alfred or to any other person	
15	at the time of the shots. At the time	
	of the shooting, it was not the case	
16	that any person was about to be run	
17	over by the vehicle with no	
18	opportunity to get out of the way.	
19	127. From the standpoint of police	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 11.
20	practices, including basic police	
	training, POST standards, and the	
21	County of San Bernardino's own	
22	policies, Deputy Alfred's use of	
23	deadly force was improper,	
24	inappropriate, excessive and	
	unreasonable, including (but not	
25	limited to) for the following reasons:	
26	(1) this was not an immediate	
27	defense of life situation; (2)	
28	subjective fear is insufficient to justify a use of deadly force; (3) the	
20	justify a use of deadily force; (3) the	

1	shooting violated basic police	
$2 \parallel$	training; (4) Mr. Barber committed	
3	no crime involving the infliction of	
	serious injury or death; (5) Deputy	
4	Alfred could not justify shooting Mr.	
5	Barber under a fleeing felon theory;	
6	(6) Mr. Barber was not armed with a	
	gun or other weapon during this	
7	incident; (7) Mr. Barber never	
8	verbally threatened to harm Deputy	
9	Alfred; (8) Deputy Alfred had	
10	reasonable alternative measures other	
11	than shooting; (9) Deputy Alfred	
	showed no reverence for human life	
12	when he fired at Mr. Barber; (10)	
13	police officers are trained that they	
14	must justify every shot they fire, and all six of Deputy Alfred's shots were	
	unjustified.	
15	Mon	roll
16	128. Contrary to basic police training,	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 90:7-9;
17	Deputy Alfred testified that he has	DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 6(j).
18	not been trained to give a verbal	" 💞
19	warning prior to using deadly force.	
	129. Contrary to basic police training,	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 89:23-
20	Deputy Alfred testified that he has	90:1; DeFoe Decl. at ¶ 6(b).
21	not been trained that deadly force	
22	should only be used if there is an	
23	immediate threat of death or serious	
	bodily injury.	
24	130. Contrary to basic police training,	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 90:7-9;
25	Deputy Alfred testified that he has	DeFoe Decl. at $\P$ 6(i).
26	not been trained that deadly force	
27	should only be used where there are no other reasonable options.	
11	no other reasonable obitons	

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- 11		
1	131. Alfred also testified that at the	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 11:9-
$_{2}\Vert$	time of the incident, he understood	13:6.
	that the County's policy directed that	
3	deputies "shall not" shoot at a	
4	moving vehicle, and that after the	
5	April 2021 shooting of Barber, the	
6	verbiage of the policy changed from	
	"shall not" to "generally."	
7	132. Deputy Alfred's interview in this	"Exhibit 1" (Alfred Depo) at 6:16-25.
8	case was not conducted until	
9	approximately two weeks after the	
10	shooting.	
10		

#### PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Defendants are entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's first and second causes of (*sic*) brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because those claims are barred under the doctrine of *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). *See Heck*, 512 U.S. at 487; *Sanders v. City of Pittsburg*, 14 F.4th 968, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2021); *Lemos v. Cnty. of Sonoma*, 40 F.4th 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2022) (*en banc*).

### Plaintiff's Response:

Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are not barred under the doctrine of *Heck v*. *Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Success on Plaintiff's excessive force claim would not undermine the validity of the PC §245(a)(1) conviction. *Beets v. County of Los Angeles*, 200 Cal. App. 4th 916, (2011); *People v. White*, 101 Cal. App. 3d 161, 167 (1980) (a peace officer cannot be engaged in the "lawful performance of his duties" where the officer used excessive force). *Rodriguez v. City of Long Beach*, 2011 WL 3757122, at \*5 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 25, 2011, No. SACV 10-00271 DOC) (citing *Sanford v. Motts*, 258 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001))

 $\parallel / /$ 

Deputy Alfred is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's first cause of

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## **Plaintiff's Response:**

Deputy Alfred is not entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment because a reasonable jury could find that Deputy Alfred used excessive and unreasonable force when he shot Mr. Barber. Vos. v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2018); Glenn v. Washington Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2011); Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 1997); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Deputy Alfred is not entitled to qualified immunity because: (1) where, as here, material facts are disputed, summary judgment is not available; (2) the law was clearly established that using deadly force under the facts of this case would violate Mr. Barber's constitutional right to be free from excessive force; and (3) the shooting violated basic police training with respect to the use of deadly force and shooting at moving vehicles. Villanueva v. State of California, 986 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2021), Orn v. City of Tacoma, 949 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2020); A.D. v. California Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 458 (9th Cir. 2013); Adams v. Speers, 473 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2007); Acosta v. City & Cnty. of S. F., 83 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1996); Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2003) ("training

materials are relevant not only to whether the force employed in this case was

3. The County is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's second cause of action for Monell liability based on unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice because there is no underlying constitutional violation. Further, there is no evidence of any longstanding unlawful custom, policy, or practice. See Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020); Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2021).

### **Plaintiff's Response:**

The County is not entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's Monell claim. There is an underlying constitutional violation as described above. Further, there is evidence of a longstanding unlawful custom, policy, or practice with respect to the use of deadly force and a failure to provide adequate training with respect to the use of deadly force and training with respect to shooting at moving vehicles specifically. Monell v. Dep't Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (2018); Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646-47 (9th Cir. 1991); City of St. Lous v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988).

4. Deputy Alfred is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's third cause of action for battery because undisputed facts demonstrate that the force used by Deputy Alfred was objectively reasonable. Furthermore, the County is not vicariously liable because there are no underlying wrongful acts. See Johnson v. Cnty. of L.A., 340 F.3d 787, 794 (9th Cir. 2003).

### **Plaintiff's Response:**

Alfred is not entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's battery claim because a reasonable jury could find that the force used by Deputy Alfred was objectively unreasonable and not necessary to defend human life. The County is vicariously liable on this claim. *Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.*, 724 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2013); *Munoz v. City of Union City*, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1121 n.6 (2004); Judicial Council Of California Civil Jury Instruction 1305B; Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a).

5. Deputy Alfred is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for negligence because undisputed facts demonstrate that Deputy Alfred acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances and did not breach any duty of due care that they owed to Plaintiff. Furthermore, the County is not vicariously liable because there are no underlying wrongful acts. See Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 57 Cal.4th 622, 629–30 (2013).

### Plaintiff's Response:

Alfred is not entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim because a reasonable jury could find that the force used by Deputy Alfred was negligent and not necessary to defend human life, and Deputy Alfred's tactics and conduct leading up to the shooting were negligent. The County is vicariously liable on this claim. Judicial Council Of California Civil Jury Instruction 441; Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a); Tabares v. City of Huntington Beach, 988 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2021); Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 629 (2013).

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Alfred is not entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because a reasonable jury could find that in the head caused severe emotional distress to Mr. Barber. The County is vicariously liable on this claim. Warren v. Marcus, 78 F.Supp.3d 1228, 1250 (N.D.

6. Deputy Alfred is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act because undisputed facts demonstrate that there was no underlying constitutional violation. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any specific intent to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. In addition, the County is not vicariously liable because there are no underlying wrongful acts. See Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043-45 (9th Cir. 2018).

### **Plaintiff's Response:**

Alfred is not entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's Bane Act claim because a reasonable jury could find that Deputy Alfred acted with a reckless disregard for Mr. Barber's constitutional right to be free from excessive force. The County is vicariously liable on this claim. Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018). (quoting *United States v. Reese*, 2 F.3d 870, 855 (9th Cir. 1993)).

7. Deputy Alfred is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's sixth cause of action

for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the undisputed facts

"extreme and outrageous" or that he had the requisite intent. Furthermore,

there is no evidence of Plaintiff's severe and emotional distress or causation. In

wrongful acts. See Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043–45 (9th Cir.

addition, the County is not vicariously liable because there are no underlying

demonstrate that there is no evidence that Deputy Alfred's conduct was

2018). **Plaintiff's Response:** Deputy Alfred's conduct was extreme and outrageous and find that being shot

MATERIAL FACTS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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